Seismologists from Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States have rescued the Soviet-era archive of nuclear explosion seismograms recorded at Borovoye in northern Kazakhstan during the period 1966-1996. The signals had been stored on about 8000 magnetic tapes, which were held at the recording observatory. After hundreds of man-years of work, these digital waveforms together with significant metadata are now available via the project URL, namely http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Data/ as a modern open database, of use to diverse communities.
Introduction
Seismic monitoring was developed in Kazakhstan by the USSR from the mid-1960s to the end of the Soviet era in 1991 with central planning from Moscow, in the specialized context of military programs to monitor nuclear weapons testing at sites around the world. Under these programs, high quality work was performed in seismometer design and construction, in field surveys to discover suitable sites for instrument deployment, and in the development of methods of data analysis and interpretation.
Kazakhstan turned out to provide superb sites for seismometer operation, because: (a) the whole country is deep within the interior of the Eurasian continent, a long way from the usual ocean-wave sources of seismic noise, so that sites could readily be found that were very quiet; and (b) the geological structures, particularly of Northern Kazakhstan, allow seismic waves to propagate very efficiently, with minimal attenuation and minimal scattering. As a result, seismographic stations in Kazakhstan began as early as the 1960s to acquire high-quality data from nuclear explosions, which occurred somewhere around the world at a rate of approximately once a week for the 30-year period from 1961 to 1990. The seismic data (secret at that time in the Soviet Union) were used by the USSR to monitor nuclear explosions carried out by the USA, France, the UK, and China, using signals that propagated in the Earth for thousands of kilometers from nuclear test sites used by these countries, to the seismometer sites in Kazakhstan. Such signals are called teleseismic, and it is a testament to the detection capability of stations in Kazakhstan that they could reliably record teleseismic signals from distant explosions with yield down to about one kiloton (about magnitude 4, using a scale based on teleseismic P-waves). The monitoring facilities also recorded nuclear explosions carried out by the USSR itself, many of them within Kazakhstan (for example at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, the location of about 350 underground nuclear explosions), using seismic signals that propagated in many instances less than a thousand kilometers to the in-country recording sites. Such signals are called regional, and they can be detected routinely even from explosions as small as about ten tons (about magnitude 2.5, using a scale based on regional signals that enables the assignment of magnitude for events too small the characterize teleseismically). Borovoye data are important today, primarily because they provide so many examples of the types of regional signal needed to monitor for nuclear explosions down to very low yield.
At several sites in Kazakhstan, operated by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, the seismic data were obtained with digital recording systems. Seismic data can be recorded in analog form, for example by pen on paper, or photographically. But digital recording is much preferred over analog since digital data can more readily be analyzed for their frequency content, and for signals of interest in the presence of other signals and noise. Digital recording of seismic signals did not become widespread in western countries until the 1970s, and there are no western archives of digital data that document earthquakes and explosions prior to 1975 except for a limited number of seismic events in regions of special study.
Nuclear weapons testing has occurred only at greatly reduced levels since the mid-1990s. Moratoria on testing have been instituted by the USA, the Russian Federation, the UK, France, and China, in the context of these nuclear weapon states all having signed (and in some cases ratified) the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. Such moratoria will become an actual ban on nuclear testing when the CTBT enters into force. Kazakhstan still has an important role to play in seismic monitoring for nuclear explosions, but the context is now arms control, and monitoring to demonstrate the absence of nuclear explosions. There is also the continuing need to monitor countries that are not CTBT signatories and which may carry on with active programs of nuclear testing. India and Pakistan carried out tests in May 1998; the only country testing in the present century, to date, is North Korea, which at this time of writing is known to have conducted underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.
Kazakhstan is superbly located for purposes of acquiring teleseismic and regional seismic signals to monitor the territories of China, Russia, and countries of South Asia (India and Pakistan) plus Central Asia and the Middle East. The specific purpose of explosion monitoring includes verifying compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the CTBT. The extensive growth in worldwide deployment of high-quality broadband seismographic stations (there are now several thousand of them) took place too late for the great majority of these stations to record nuclear explosions. The Borovoye archive is thus important today as a training set, especially useful for understanding the types of regional seismic signals which travel in the Earth's crust and uppermost mantle, and that are needed to monitor for low yield nuclear explosions.
In the USSR, one of the primary nuclear testing sites was in eastern Kazakhstan near the town of Semipalatinsk. At that time seismology throughout much of Central Asia was heavily controlled by scientists from the Ministry of Defense and Academy of Sciences of the USSR. While there were well-established earthquake studies programs in the most seismically active areas along the southern border in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Tien Shan mountains of southern Kazakhstan, most of the seismological observations in central and northern Kazakhstan were focused on classified monitoring of the Soviet and foreign nuclear test sites.
In the mid 1980s, the Soviet government agreed to allow US university groups to make seismological observations at temporary locations surrounding the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. This work was part of a program sponsored by the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. An outgrowth of that program was an agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Incorporated Research Institutions in Seismology (a consortium of US universities with graduate programs in seismology, often called IRIS) to establish permanent seismographic observatories throughout the USSR as part of the Global Seismographic Network being developed by IRIS and the US Geological Survey. Stations were established in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but Kazakhstan remained closed for permanent observatories.
With the gradual opening of the USSR in the early 1990s, details on extensive Soviet seismological facilities in Kazakhstan began to emerge. In June 1991, Paul Richards of Columbia University and Göran Ekström, then of Harvard University, visited the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory, previously a secret operation, and were introduced to the monitoring facilities and data archive there. In 1993, the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan was created and Sections below give more details on: the Borovoye station and associated interactions between scientists from Kazakhstan, Russia, and the USA; the first major release of digital recordings of nuclear explosions from Borovoye, in April 2001; and the second major data release, which incorporated a substantial effort to deglitch the signals from nuclear explosions conducted in Eurasia. This last release also provided detail on the responses of the various seismometers and recording systems used at Borovoye.
We give examples of the signals recorded at Borovoye, and comment on their utility.
The Borovoye seismographic station
Seismic recording in digital form began at Borovoye in 1966 as described by An et al. [4] under the auspices of a field program of the USSR Academy of Sciences. High-quality seismic observations continued to about 2008 when the Observatory grounds were taken over by organizations planning hotels and a casino at this site, which with its lake, rock formations, and local mountains and forests, is scenically attractive.
Prior to 1991, Russian books and journals of geophysics published detailed descriptions of seismometers and digital recording systems operated at a site characterized as ''experimental'' and ''in Northern Kazakhstan'' or ''in Eastern Kazakhstan.'' Several articles also appeared in western journals, authored by senior Russian seismologists, describing data and sophisticated methods of data analysis (e.g., [9] ), that were using signals from this same station, later identified (e.g., [1] ) as the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory. Adushkin and An [2] state that the ''. . .Borovoye station has been used to test the majority of new Soviet instrumentation, including various digital systems.'' The digital data at Borovoye were mostly written on 35 mm wide tapes and were stored at the Observatory. This original seismogram archive holds data from one of the few digital seismographic stations operated anywhere in the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and provides unique data for the Central Asia region for the whole 30-year period from commencement of recording, up to the end of regular nuclear weapons testing by the recognized nuclear weapons states in 1996. The archive is invaluable for global seismological studies, due to its longevity of homogeneous observation over more than 25 years, and the lownoise conditions in northern Kazakhstan. Due to the cost of recording tape, the archive is segmented rather than continuous, typically having a few hundred files per day from the various different channels as described further below.
There are about 8000 digital seismogram archive tapes. Each magnetic tape has about 10 megabytes of digital seismogram data. Digital data were recorded by three different Russian systems, called KOD, STsR-SS, and STsR-TSG. Signals come from about 100,000 seismic events, which include earthquakes, industrial and nuclear explosions, and industrial accidents. The archive also contains some recordings from a former Soviet Army base near Borovoye and digital data from seismographic stations in Central This rationale for rescuing the Borovoye archive, with its information on the signals from nuclear explosions carried out under a variety of different conditions, has turned out to be sufficiently persuasive that the work was eventually done, as reported in this paper, though it took more than 20 years to execute.
The first release of borovoye data
The BRV digital archive of nuclear explosion waveforms from 711 underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) was originally made available in April 2001 (for example, via http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Arch/BRV_arch_exp.html), as an outcome of the International Science and Technology Center project mentioned above, which provided 180 man-years of funding to scientists and technicians in Kazakhstan and Russia for several different projects, of which the most time-consuming was saving the Borovoye waveform archive. Table 1 gives basic information on these 711 UNEs. Fig. 1 shows the location (BRV) of the Borovoye Observatory, and the main nuclear test sites at which UNEs were conducted and for which signals exist in the BRV archive.
The archive of nuclear explosion signals was issued as a series of modern databases, described by Kim et al. [11] , in a 41-page report available today via http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/Monitoring/ Data/Brv_arch_ex/brv_text_table.pdf. The archive was derived from original Soviet-era magnetic tapes that in many cases were in very bad condition, and for which only a limited number of tape readers existed. The tapes were written in complicated formats that had not been used even in the USSR for decades. For example, many tapes had 24 channels of information written across 17 separate tracks. The first steps in salvaging the archive were reading all the bits one last time from the original tapes using one of the few available tape readers, and then writing them to a mid-1990s mass store hard drive. Later steps entailed extraction of timing information, de-multiplexing, and re-formatting.
Here, we may note that three different sets of Soviet-style instruments and recording systems were deployed at BRV from 1966 to 1996. They are known as the KOD, STsR-SS, and STsR-TSG systems (sometimes abbreviated to KO or KOD, SS, and TS or TSG).
The first BRV digital seismic system, KOD, began recording in 1966 and operated continuously from 1967 to 1973. It is based on three-component, short-period seismometers, and is important as one of the few digital seismic systems anywhere in the world in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The other Soviet-era BRV digital systems began operation in February 1973. STsR-SS is intended mainly for low-gain recording. STsR-TSG includes six long-period and seven short-period Kirnos seismometers, most recorded at two gain levels, for a total (SS + TS) of 20 data channels. The highest sensitivity is 100,000
54˚E
55˚E 56˚E counts/micron based on a short-period Kirnos with a special magnet and a low-noise amplifier. This instrument was important at BRV for teleseismic monitoring of numerous French and US UNEs. All of these main systems are approximately flat to ground displacement over a range of frequencies. Kim and Ekström [10] have published details of the STsR-TSG instrumental system, which has many channels, extending across almost 3 decades in frequency. Information on the other two systems has not previously been given in western scientific papers, and is given below.
We note that numerous modern broadband sensors began to be deployed at Borovoye once it opened to western scientists, the first of which was installed by Won-Young Kim in July 1994. These modern sensors recorded the final underground nuclear explosions conducted by China, the May 1998 tests of India and Pakistan, and the tests in this century by North Korea. They have also recorded numerous earthquakes at regional distances. The station code BRVK is used to represent Borovoye today.
During the cold war, when so many underground nuclear tests were conducted (more than 1500), the signals recorded at Borovoye were in the teleseismic range for explosions at the main test sites used by the USA, the UK, and France. Fig. 2 shows the location of USA and UK nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site (today, called the Nevada National Security Site), for which there are teleseismic signals in the Borovoye archive. Fig. 3 shows the location of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, whose teleseismic signals were recorded at BRV (via paths in this case that traversed the Earth's core). Of particular interest in the Borovoye archive, are the signals of UNEs recorded at regional distances. Such signals are typically more complicated that those recorded teleseismically, but they are important to understand in view of the fact that they can enable monitoring to be carried out for UNEs of lower magnitude. Therefore, special efforts have been made, as we next describe, to improve the usability of Borovoye recordings made from nuclear tests conducted in Eurasia, many of which were at regional distances from the Observatory.
The second release of Borovoye data
The Borovoye archive made available to researchers in 2001 had two substantial defects, both of which have been corrected in the second major data release, which focuses on the signals from underground nuclear explosions in Eurasia. First, the digital data for some signals suffered from a significant number of glitches, and it was left to the user to decide how to manage them. Second, information on the instrument responses of the numerous different recording channels was incomplete, thus preventing much of the archive from being used for spectral analysis or for applications requiring knowledge of absolute ground motion derived from the recordings.
Issuance of the archive in 2001 promoted efforts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to remove the glitches, and scientific results based upon the deglitched records, for those recordings for which the instrument responses were known, found many uses. Consequently a new project was initiated, with the intent to complete work on deglitching and instrument responses. This work has now been concluded, and the deglitched waveforms are available at http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/ Arch/BRV_arch_deglitched.html. Fig. 4 shows the location of Borovoye, and of the hundreds of nuclear explosions in Eurasia recorded by the Observatory. In many cases these recordings were made at regional distances, and thus include seismic signals known as Pn, Pg, Sn, and Lg, which have traveled mainly in the Earth's crust and uppermost mantle rather than at greater depths in the Earth's interior. Table 2 summarizes the numbers of recorded explosions in Eurasia and the numbers of recordings (traces) associated with six different groups of explosions, namely the Balapan, Degelen, and Murzhik sub-regions of the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan; the Novaya Zemlya Test Site in Russia; the wide-ranging locations of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) conducted by the Soviet Union; and the Lop Nor Test Site in China. Fig. 5 through Fig. 8 show the locations of underground nuclear explosions, for which deglitched data are now available, in four different groupings, namely: the Semipalatinsk Test Site (Fig. 5) ; the Novaya Zemlya Test Site (Fig. 6) ; the Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Fig. 7) ; and the Lop Nor Test Site in China (Fig. 8) . Tables 3-5 , list information for these explosions at the sub-regions Balapan, Degelen, and Murzhik (respectively) for the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Tables 6-8, give explosion details for Novaya Zemlya, Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, and Lop Nor (China). In these Tables, the precision of the seismically determined origin times are indicated by their decimal points. The column headed ''Instrument type'' specifies the instrument used, and KODB = KOD high-gain system; KODM = KOD low-gain system; SS = STsR-SS system; TSG = STsR-TSG system (see Kim and Ekström, 1996) ;
Deglitching and deriving instrument responses
Following the first release of Borovoye data in April 2001, personnel at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) became familiar with the BRV archive. They processed approximately one third of it to remove glitches, using the results of Kim and Ekström [10] to correct for instrument response for the TSG recording system in use at BRV, and used the resulting corrected waveforms in a variety of practical studies to improve nuclear explosion monitoring in Central Asia and the surrounding regions.
These corrected waveforms were used for regional seismic discrimination studies, coda wave magnitude studies, and regional M s studies, primarily using the STsR-TSG or TS instrumentation. LANL personnel also used a limited subset of the earlier KOD and STsR-SS [20] for 715 nuclear tests in USSR. mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18] . Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6] . NNC = ground truth location reported by the National Nuclear Center [21] . AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17] . Doubl = double test (preceded or followed by another test at Degelen within a few seconds). data for discrimination studies of selected events, but were unable to use discriminants based on ratios of different frequency bands as the archive did not then contain response information for those earlier systems (KOD, SS). A coordinated effort was therefore begun in 2007, by personnel at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory and LANL, to remove glitches and to incorporate instrument response information for the KOD and SS systems as well as for TSG, and thus to access information from all channels of Borovoye data, for underground nuclear explosions conducted in Eurasia.
Technical approach to deglitching
When the BRV archive was made generally available in 2001, the decision was made that it be essentially in its original unprocessed form (though with the addition of basic header information), but converted to a modern and widely use format for digital seismic data (namely, CSS3.0). The original Soviet-era recordings had some severe problems, most notoriously that the digitizer typically did not write a count value on seismic waveform channels at the time when the time channel was writing the marker for an integer second. The waveform data therefore ended up with glitches, which could be numerous in some recordings of ground motion. The original recording system addressed the practical problem of input signals having wide dynamic range, by having several different channels set at different gain levels, each recording with a limited number of bits (often, only 11 bits), so that although each UNE was usually recorded on several channels, in practice these channels were often either clipped or had inadequate resolution.
Despite these defects, ways to extract the underlying information have been found. For example, empirical travel-time information, needed to generate Source Specific Station Corrections for the BRV station (which today is part of the International Monitoring System headquartered in Vienna) can be obtained by picking first and secondary arrivals from a high-gain channel. But the spectrum of the strongest ground motion is often best obtained from one of the lower-gain channels. Coda can be measured from both highgain and low-gain channels.
Raw waveforms of the Borovoye archive are contaminated with glitches on all seismometer channels and their different gain levels, for the entire time period that data are available. Many glitches are Table 4 . Test no. = unique test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for 715 nuclear tests in USSR. mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18] and Ringdal et al. [26] . Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6] . Leith = ground truth location from Leith [16] for entrance to the tunnels. AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17] . Khalturin = location and origin time from Khalturin et al. [15] . Doubl = double test (preceded or followed by another test at Balapan within a few seconds. Table 5 . Test no. = unique test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for 715 nuclear tests in USSR. mb(P) = teleseismic body-wave magnitude from Marshall et al. [18] and Ringdal et al. [26] . Bocharov = ground truth data from Bocharov et al. [6] . AWE = origin time from Lilwall and Farthing [17] . Khalturin = location and origin time from Khalturin et al. [15] . Table 6 . Test no. = unique test id number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) for nuclear tests in USSR; mb(P), from Marshall et al. [19] ; location and origin time from Marshall et al. [19] and Richards [22] . salvo exp. (salvo explosion) means two or more separate explosions where a period of time between successive individual explosions does not exceed 5 s and where the burial points of all explosive devices can be connected by segments of straight lines, each of them connecting two burial points and does not exceed 40 km in length. not visible to the naked eye on the vertical scale of these plots, so the problem is more extensive than it may appear from just plotting the seismogram trace. There appear to be at least two sources of glitches. The most easily corrected and explained are at time marks (see above) characterized by a distinct period. These are typically the glitches having the largest amplitude. There are some waveforms for which the time-mark glitch is the only problem. The type of glitch found to be more difficult and time-consuming to correct, concerned instances that typically involved bit errors. Thus, during interactive passes over problematic waveforms, we found many glitches where the difference between the glitch and the apparent waveform was either a power of 2 (e.g. 16, 32, 64, 128 ...) or a sum of powers of 2 (e.g. 48 = 16 + 32, 96 = 32 + 64, 80 = 16 + 64, ...) which represent bit failures either in the original data stream or in the long-term deterioration of the archive. Many of these small bit errors are readily found by the deglitcher that will be discussed below. The labor to do this work was time-consuming and required technical judgments.
The most common defects in the salvaged Borovoye waveform archive resulting from the ISTC project were single point glitches and multiple point glitches of short duration. We did not investigate the sources of the glitches in detail, but simply resolved to repair them via interpolation to allow subsequent analysis of the digital data. We discovered a range of glitch amplitudes in these data, many smaller than waveform amplitudes, which compelled us to design an automated, interactive script to perform the repair work.
The repair procedure developed and applied at Los Alamos National Laboratory relies upon a high passed, differentiated trace to identify glitches, and a fourth-order polynomial fit to find the glitch edge points and perform the repair. Prior to analysis, we marked poor data, such as saturated intervals, that the automated procedure should ignore. We also removed the median and applied ten-point tapers to the beginning and end of the entire waveform. To identify glitches, we differentiated the trace, then applied a two-pole, causal, high pass Butterworth filter with a corner set to two-thirds the Nyquist frequency, removed the median, and took absolute values. This procedure brought out small glitches that would otherwise be buried in the waveform. The user sets a threshold and a time window, and the procedure cycles through that subset of glitches. Additional passes with lower thresholds or different time windows may be run until the user decides that repair is complete.
For each glitch that is identified using the high-pass, differentiated trace, we set an initial analysis window of length ten times the sample interval. A fourth-order polynomial is fit to the waveform data in this window, using L1 minimization to avoid effects of the glitch. Glitches are defined using a three-sigma threshold based on a robust residual spread estimate (median absolute deviation, MAD; e.g., [27] ), and are replaced using the polynomial coefficients. The L1 fit procedure matches five waveform points exactly, and those points may or may not include the nearest edge points on either side of the glitch. As a fine adjustment, we add a linear function to the polynomial to ensure that those edge points are matched exactly. The original glitch and repaired waveform are then displayed, whereupon the user may: Table 7 : Test no. = nuclear test number given in Mikhailov et al. (1996) . Date and Time = origin time of the tests given in Sultanov et al. [30] . Latitude and Longitude = location of tests as given in Sultanov et al. [30] . mb(P) = body-wave magnitude of the tests given in Sultanov et al. [30] . Distance = epicentral distance in degrees from the PNE to Borovoye. Az = azimuth in degrees from the station to PNE. Precision of the origin time was indicated in Sultanov et al. by the decimal point. Further discussion of PNE ground truth information is given by Fujita et al. [8] . Table 7 . Location and origin time from Engdahl [7] ; teleseismic body-wave magnitude from the US Geological Survey's Preliminary Determination of Epicenters. Precision locations for Lop Nor nuclear explosions are given by Waldhauser et al. [31] .
(1) accept the repair; (2) pick one or more of the glitch edge points and window endpoints, and refit the waveform; (3) expand the window, pick as above, and refit the waveform; or (4) skip the repair of that segment. Fig. 9 shows two versions of a recording, lasting about 200 s, of a Borovoye digital seismogram of an underground nuclear test. The deglitched version is shown in red, in comparison with the glitched record shown in black. The quality of the deglitched data is high enough to enable detailed spectral analysis, and evaluation of methods of discrimination between earthquakes and explosions [24] .
The next two sub-sections describe the two earliest seismographic systems used at Borovoye.
The KOD digital seismograph system
The KOD system was intended for multichannel digital recordings of ground motion via magnetic tape for three components seconds after explosion occurrence (Z, N-S, E-W) in the frequency band 0.03-5 Hz. This band of recording was provided by two separate seismometers: the relatively long-period SKD seismometer; and the short-period SKM-3 seismometer, combined as described by Osadchiy and Daragan [23] .
However at Borovoye the KOD system was used somewhat differently. It was modified to be based upon the SKM-3 seismometer, using a pre-amplifier with low self-noise, a post-amplifier, and A/D converter, and a switch with ten channels. Five even channels (called KODB, with higher gain) were written to magnetic tape using one tape recorder (LMR), and five uneven channels (called KODM, with lower gain) were written to magnetic tape by using another tape recorder. The full dynamic range on the two levels was about 80 dB, providing for registration of ground displacement from 3 nm to 12,000 nm in the band from 0.4 Hz to 5 Hz. Fig. 10 shows several amplitude responses of the KODB system. Time corrections to the internal clock of the KOD system were noted each 12 h with an accuracy of about 0.01 s, and time corrections were noted in a log book. For example, the time correction to the arrival time of the Pn-wave from the PNE of September 8, 1969 , is À0.55 s.
The STsR-SS digital seismograph system
Commonly abbreviated as the SS system, this consists of a 3-component, short-period seismometer, namely SKM-3 (Kirnos high-gain) and a 3-component, extended-period seismometer called SKD (Kirnos-Arkhangel'skiy broadband) [28, 29] .
The STsR-SS system recorded a total of 10 channels on 17-track tape with 11-bit analog-to-digital conversion. Usually, the data streams consisted of signals from 3-component short-period, 3-component extended-period, and a low-gain short-period vertical component.
Shishkevish [28] called the SKD seismometer with the natural period, T 0 = 25 s, an extended-period seismometer, a term that we also adopted. The SKM-3 seismometer is the later model of SKM and has an adjustable natural period, T 0 , between 1.5 to 3.5 s [28] . Hence, it is also called a short-to-intermediate-period high-gain seismometer. We called it a high-gain short-period seismometer in our data rescue project.
From 1973 June 06 to 1981 June 30, 3-component shortperiod signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on channels 7, 8 and 9 for vertical-, NS-, and EW-components, respectively.
These three-component data are assigned component names s07Z, s08 N and s09E; low-gain vertical-component SKM-3 data were recorded on channel 1 (s01Z); 3-component extended-period signals from the SKD seismometer are recorded on channels 2, 3, and 4 (102Z, 103 N and 104E); and channels 5, 6 and 10 were unused.
From 1981 August 14 to 1982 July 04, 3-component short-period signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on channels 7, 8 and 9 for vertical-, NS-, and EW-components, respectively. The sampling interval for these channels was changed from 0.032 s to 0.024 s. The low-gain vertical-component SKM-3 data were recorded on channel 6 (s06Z) with a sampling interval of 0.096 s. Notes on Table 9 . KOD (KODB and KODM) systems were operated from 1966-Nov 1973 and had polarity reversal on all channels; STsR-SS (SS) and STsR-TSG (TSG) systems were operated from Feb. 1973 to 1995. T 0 = seismometer natural period in seconds. D s = seismometer damping constant, critical damping = 0.71. Gain = sensitivity in counts/lm for ground displacement. freqn = normalization frequency, where the gain is measured. Dt = sampling interval in milliseconds.
LG = low-gain channels and (Z) indicates that it is only vertical-component.
3-component extended-period signals from the SKD seismometer were recorded on channels 2, 3, and 4 (l02Z, l03 N and l04E); and channels 1, 5 and 10 were unused. Although the sampling intervals have changed for short-period channels (6, 7, 8, and 9) , the shapes of the amplitude responses for these channels followed the previous period. From 1982 August 23 to 1991 July 15, 3-component shortperiod signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on channels 7, 8 and 9 (component name: s07Z, s08 N and s09E); low-gain vertical-component signals from the SKM-3 seismometer were recorded on channel 6 (s06Z); 3-component extended-period signals from SKD seismometer were recorded on channels 2, 3, and 4 (102Z, l03 N and 104E); and low-gain 3-component extended-period SKD data were recorded on channels 1, 5 and 10 (101Z, 105 N and 110E); hence all of the 10 channels of the STsR-SS system were utilized during this period, but we note that the shapes of the amplitude responses for all channels were changed from those of the previous periods. Fig. 11 shows 40 available frequency-amplitude calibration curves for the STsR-SS system, for the period 1973 to 1991 given in the Borovoye waveform data archive.
Summary of instrument responses at BRV
In Table 9 , we summarize responses for all three systems at Borovoye: KOD, SS, and TSG. Extensive additional details on all three systems, and how they changed with time, are to be found in a technical report by Kim et al. [14] , available on-line as http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Doc/AFRL-RV-HA-TR-2010-1024_07C0004_Final.pdf.
Examples of regional signals
More than 3700 deglitched and calibrated seismograms from nuclear explosions in Eurasia, many of them recorded at regional distances, are for many users the main result of this project. Prior to the deglitching effort, personnel at Los Alamos National Laboratory had become familiar with some of these data, in particular with waveforms recorded on the TSG system. With our second data release we have approximately trebled the number of waveforms analyzed, by successfully processing the data recorded by earlier systems. Here we give examples of the waveforms from all three systems.
From Table 2 we see that these thousands of waveforms can be organized into 497 sets, each set corresponding to one particular underground nuclear explosion (UNE), as recorded on one of the three different systems at Borovoye. These waveforms, now deglitched and documented with instrument responses, are the main result of this project, together with preliminary analyses of these data as presented in the US at Monitoring Research Reviews in 2007, 2008, and 2009 [12,13,5] . Details of the sampling rate and instrument response of the three systems emerged throughout the years in which we did our work. Difficulties of the KOD system included Soviet publications describing the impulse response that did not match our own information from stations operators in Kazakhstan. Difficulties of the SS system included changes in sampling rate and an appreciation that the data are aliased to some degree-details that were not thoroughly understood until late in the project.
We have prepared all 497 of these waveform sets as a series of PDF documents to enable potential users to get a sense of which seismograms are likely to be useful for reading arrival times (a high-gain channel may be best), or for computing spectra (a lowgain channel may be best for this purpose), or for coda studies (both low-gain and high-gain channels are relevant). These files are available to interested users online via http://www.ldeo. columbia.edu/res/pi/Monitoring/Arch/BRV_arch_deglitched.html but there are far too many to include in this paper. Instead, to present our results in an orderly way in this section, we give 5 sets of examples, in Fig. 12 through Fig. 16 , each set representing the seismograms from one particular underground nuclear test as recorded on a particular digital seismographic system-either KOD, or SS, or TSG. 
Specific seismograms
Our choice, in culling the 497 sets down to 5 has been, first, to show for the Balapan region of the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan, the first UNE as recorded on the KOD system (Fig. 12) , on the SS system (Fig. 13) , and on the TSG system (Fig. 14) . And then we show the last PNE recorded on the SS system (Fig. 15) , and finally the last UNE at the Lop Nor Test site as recorded on the TSG system (Fig. 16) .
Thus, Fig. 12 shows the first of seven sets of BRV seismograms on the KOD system for a UNE at Balapan (the test of 1968 June 19 recorded at less than a thousand km). It shows high-gain and low-gain channels, and immediately it is apparent which channels are appropriate for picking arrival times (high-gain), measuring spectral levels (low-gain) and quantifying coda (both high-gain and low-gain). This is a short-period set of records, which may be compared and contrasted with the seismograms (also from Balapan explosions) shown in Fig. 13 (SS) and Fig. 14 (TSG) , which contain extended band-width information, and which, for example contain Rg signals (a Rayleigh wave, excited only by very shallow seismic sources). The longer-period records have Rg as the strongest phase at this regional distance.
There is a total of 343 sets of records for UNEs in all sub-regions of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, and these regional signals with their Pg, Pn, Sn, Lg, and Rg phases are now available for study of different source effects as documented by a digital station, Borovoye, that long operated at the same distance from the test site. In contrast with these regional signals, the teleseismic recordings from Novaya Zemlya UNEs show impulsive teleseismic P-wave arrivals. Fig. 15 shows some of the SS system seismograms for an unusual PNE conducted in the Soviet Union on 1984 July 21, consisting of three separate nuclear shots five minutes apart. P-arrivals are very impulsive, with weak S-waves arriving later. And finally Fig. 16 shows some of the TSG system seismograms for a UNE at the Lop Nor Test Site, in China, for the explosion of 1995 May 15. The regional waves are still quite strong, though teleseismic waves are arriving also. The Rg phase again is an indication of a very shallow seismic source.
Concluding summary and comments
More than 2000 nuclear test explosions were conducted during the Cold War (about three-quarters of them, underground). They took place about once a week from the 1940s to the 1980s, initially in the atmosphere and then mostly underground after the mid1960s. They represent an extreme activity in human history. Most of them took place in an era when there were very few seismographic stations operating with the high standards routinely achieved via broadband high-dynamic-range instrumentation available today.
This project took advantage of Soviet-era digital seismic recordings, all of them made at the Borovoye Geophysical Observatory in Kazakhstan, of ground motion from numerous underground nuclear explosions that occurred globally over a period of three decades, from 1966 to 1996. We have prepared these recordings in a modern format, to make them usable by the seismic monitoring community for numerous ongoing and future studies of Earth structure, attenuation characteristics, and explosion source physics including source representation by body force equivalents and associated source spectra. We have paid special attention to the recordings of underground nuclear explosions conducted in Eurasia, because many of them took place at regional distances (typically, less than a thousand km) from Borovoye, so that they contain the types of seismic signal most useful for detecting and characterizing small nuclear explosions.
To produce the newly-formatted signals required major efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory to remove glitches in the original records, and at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory to obtain instrument responses. Three different recording systems operated at Borovoye: the KOD system from 1967 to 1973; the SS system from 1973 to 1990; and the TSG system from 1974 to 1995. Each system included channels of low-gain and high-gain recording; and each system included vertical, north/south, and east/west channels. In the final years of this data rescue, particular attention was paid to data from the KOD and SS systems, which had not previously been deglitched and instrument-corrected. We have prepared waveforms from nuclear explosions at the following five test sites: Balapan (1269 traces), Degelen (1146 traces), and Murzhik (160 traces), all in Kazakhstan on the Semipalatinsk Test site; Novaya Zemlya (461 traces) in Russia; and Lop Nor (120 traces) in China; and also from many Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (552 traces) in Russia. Although the dynamic range of specific channels is limited by the low number of bits in the recording system, the scientific content of the signals across the many different channels approaches that for modern recording systems. The improved Borovoye archive now provides many practical examples of the types of explosion signals that modern monitoring Fig. 15 . Last of 38 sets of BRV seismograms on the SS system for a PNE in the Soviet Union; tests of 1984 July 21, being three separate shots five minutes apart, centered at (51.37°N, 53.34°E), depth 900, 15 kt, mb 5. networks (which do not have large archives of explosion signals) must be designed to detect and identify.
From a long-term perspective (centuries and longer), it is important to archive high-quality signals from past explosions, to make them usable for diverse research at present and in the future, because they are unique and are so much better than earthquake signals for certain types of study of the interior of planet Earth (see, e.g., [3] ). In future we can expect that theory and computation will improve our capability to extract information from seismic signals. High-quality recordings will thus continue to provide a basis for increasing our knowledge of Earth structure, as geophysicists in the future develop better methods of analysis applied to the best signals recorded in the past. This is a project that must be maintained long-term, augmented to archive high quality signals from all energetic explosions especially from those at yield levels that will not be achieved again unless nuclear explosions resume on a large scale.
The example provided in this paper, of a successful data rescue applied to a Soviet archive of explosions recorded at regional distances, needs to be repeated for nuclear explosions conducted in the early decades of active weapons testing by the United States and the United Kingdom, by France, and by China.
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